Abstract-In this paper, we propose a systematic design framework for output-based dynamic event-triggered control (ETC) systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. These malicious DoS attacks are intended to interfere with the communication channel causing periods in time at which transmission of measurement data is impossible. We show that the proposed ETC scheme, if well designed, can tolerate a class of DoS signals characterized by frequency and duration properties without jeopardizing the stability, performance and Zeno-freeness of the ETC system. In fact, the design procedure of the ETC condition allows tradeoffs between performance, robustness to DoS attacks, and utilization of communication resources. The main results will be illustrated by means of a numerical example.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE field of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and, in particular, networked control systems (NCSs) is rapidly emerging due to a wide range of potential applications. However, there is a strong need for novel analysis and synthesis tools in control theory to guarantee safe and secure operation despite the presence of possible malicious attacks [2] . Especially for safety-critical applications, such as intelligent transport systems and power grids, this is of high importance and requires the integration of cybersecurity and control strategies.
One of the main concerns in NCSs with respect to security is deception attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Deception attacks are intended to tamper transmitted data packages causing false feedback information, see for more details, e.g., C. De Persis and P. Tesi are with Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, The Netherlands (e-mail: c.de.persis@rug.nl; p.tesi@rug.nl).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCNS.2016.2613445 [3] and the reference therein, whereas DoS attacks, induced by radio-interference signals (also referred to as jamming signals), typically cause periods in time at which communication is not possible, see, for instance, [4] . In this paper, we focus on the latter type of attack. To be more concrete, we are interested in creating control strategies that render the overall closed-loop system resilient to DoS attacks which occur according to some unknown strategy with the aim of impeding the communication of sensor measurements. In addition to this resilience requirement described before, the control strategy needs to deal with the inherent imperfections of networked communication. Communication in NCSs is, in general, packet based and thus measurement data can only be transmitted at discrete time instants. Moreover, especially since a communication network is often shared with multiple devices, the communication resources are restricted. Hence, a resource-aware and resilient control approach, which aims to only schedule the transmission of data when needed to maintain the desired stability and performance criteria, is a requisite. In a nutshell, the control problem addressed in this paper is to design a control law that limits the transmission of sensor data while realizing desired closed-loop stability and performance criteria despite the presence of DoS attacks.
The proposed solution to this challenging design problem is to adopt an event-triggered control (ETC) strategy, in which transmission times are determined online by means of welldesigned triggering rules which rely on, for example, sensor measurements of the system. The introduction of this feedback in the sampling process enables ETC schemes to reduce the utilization of communication resources without jeopardizing control performance. In contrast to periodic time-triggered control schemes, ETC schemes aim to only transmit data when needed to maintain desired closed-loop properties. However, the majority of the literature on ETC strategies does not consider cybersecurity issues, such as DoS attacks. Notable exceptions are [5] - [7] . In [7] , a method was proposed to identify features of DoS attacks in order to improve the scheduling of transmissions in the sense that the DoS periods are being avoided. However, this approach turns out to be effective only when the DoS attacks are "well-structured" over time, for example, in case of a periodic jamming signal. In [5] and [6] , a more general and more realistic DoS attack model is used based on the frequency and duration of the attacker's actions. These constraints are quite natural, as in reality, also the jammers resources are not infinite and several provisions can be taken to mitigate these DoS attacks. In addition, no assumptions regarding the underlying 2325-5870 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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jamming strategy of the attacker are made. Moreover, in contrast to stochastic packet dropout models, this characterization enables capturing a wide class of DoS attacks, including trivial, periodic, random, and protocol-aware jamming attacks [4] , [8] .
A drawback of the approaches in [5] - [7] is that these approaches are restricted to the case of static state feedback which requires the availability of full state information. Clearly, in practice, this is a strong assumption as only in rare cases the full state variable is available for feedback. For this reason, it is of interest to study event-triggered NCSs subject to DoS attacks that rely on output measurements only. To the best of our knowledge, the output feedback case in the context of DoS attacks has never been addressed in the literature. This is not surprising as, especially in the presence of disturbances, extending existing ETC schemes that rely on state feedback to the output-based ETC schemes (even without DoS attacks) is far from trivial as shown in [9] and [10] . Therefore, we propose in this paper a novel systematic design methodology for output-based resilient and resource-aware dynamic ETC strategies for a class of nonlinear systems subject to disturbances. We prove that under the proposed design conditions, the resulting closed-loop system is input-to-output stable with finite-induced L ∞ -gains (peak-topeak gains). Interestingly, this result is of independent interest in the context of switched systems under average-dwell time conditions, see also [11] .
To enable practical implementation of the ETC scheme, it is important to guarantee that the time between consecutive transmission attempts is strictly positive and preferably lower bounded by a positive constant. By exploiting the Zeno-freeness property of the ETC scheme presented in [12] and [13] , we show that for the proposed ETC scheme, such a positive minimalinterevent time (MIET) exists by design despite the presence of disturbances and/or DoS attacks. By employing the DoS characterization as presented in [5] and [6] , the obtained results hold for wide classes of relevant DoS attacks. As a matter of fact, as already mentioned, no assumptions regarding the underlying strategy of the attacker are needed, which makes the proposed scheme applicable in many contexts. The design procedure is demonstrated on a case study of cooperative adaptive cruise control. The numerical example reveals and illustrates a tradeoff between robustness with respect to DoS attacks, network utilization, and performance guarantees.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After presenting the necessary preliminaries and notational conventions in Section II, we introduce the event-triggered networked control setup subject to DoS attacks in Section III leading to the problem statement. This event-triggered NCS setup is formalized in Section IV by means of hybrid models resulting in a mathematically rigorous problem formulation. In Section V, we characterize DoS attacks in terms of frequency and duration and, based on this characterization, we provide design conditions for the proposed dynamic event-triggered strategy such that stability and performance properties are satisfied. The obtained design framework is illustrated by means of a numerical example in Section VI. Finally, we provide the concluding remarks in Section VII. Fig. 1 . Schematic representation of the event-triggered NCS considered in this paper which consists of the interconnection of P, C, and N and where the transmission instants are determined by an event-triggering mechanism (ETM). Moreover, we assume an acknowledgement scheme is available, meaning that the ETM has knowledge about the reception of packages at the controller side.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
The following notational conventions will be used in this paper. N denotes the set of all non-negative integers, N > 0 is the set of all positive integers, R is the field of all real numbers and R 0 is the set of all non-negative reals. For N ∈ N, we write the set {1, 2, . . . , N} asN . For N vectors x i ∈ R n i , i ∈N , we denote the vector obtained by stacking all vectors in one (col- n → R n is said to be locally Lipschitz continuous if for each x 0 ∈ R n there exist constants δ > 0 and L > 0 such that for all x ∈ R n we have that
III. NCS MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we present the networked control setup and the dynamic event-triggering mechanism employed by this NCS. Moreover, we describe how this NCS is affected by DoS attacks. Based on these descriptions, we formulate the problem statement.
A. Networked Control Configuration
Consider the feedback control configuration depicted in Fig. 1 . In this configuration, the sensor measurements of a plant P are being transmitted to a (dynamic) output-based controller C over a network N . The continuous-time plant P is given by
where w ∈ R n w is a disturbance input, x p ∈ R n p is the state vector, u ∈ R n u is the control input and y ∈ R n y is the measured output of plant P. The (dynamic) output-based controller C is given by
where x c ∈ R n c denotes the controller state,ŷ ∈ R n y represents the most recently received output measurement of the plant at the controller C, and u ∈ R n u is the controller output. The performance output is given by z = q(x), where z ∈ R n z and x = (x p , x c ).
Typically, the communication over the network N is packet based, which implies that the output measurements y can only be transmitted at discrete instants in time, i.e., at times t j , j ∈ N, satisfying 0 t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < . . .. Hence, at each transmission instant t j , j ∈ N, the value ofŷ is updated/jumps according toŷ(t + j ) = y(t j ), for all j ∈ N (assuming for the moment that no DoS attacks are present). Here, we considerŷ as a leftcontinuous signal in the sense thatŷ(t) = lim s→tŷ (s). Furthermore, we assume that the value ofŷ evolves in a zero-order-hold (ZOH) fashion in the sense that in between updates, the variableŷ is held constant, i.e.,ẏ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (t j , t j +1 ) with j ∈ N. The functions f p and f c are assumed to be continuous and the functions g p and g c are assumed to be continuously differentiable.
Remark 1: For the sake of brevity, we consider the control configuration presented in Fig. 1 in which we consider dynamic controllers as in (2) and only sensor measurements are transmitted over the network. However, the framework presented in this paper also applies to other configurations, such as decentralized control setups as described in [13] and [14] .
B. DoS Attacks
A DoS attack is defined as a period in time at which the communication is blocked by a malicious attacker. Hence, when a transmission of y(t j ) is attempted at transmission time t j and a DoS attack is active, the attempt will fail and, thus, the value of y cannot be updated to y(t j ). Obviously, this can have detrimental effects on the stability and performance of the closed-loop system.
In general, DoS attacks lead to a sequence of time intervals {H n } n ∈N , where the n-th time interval H n , given by H n := {h n } ∪ [h n , h n + τ n ), represents the n-th DoS attack (period). Hence, h n ∈ R 0 denotes the time instant at which the n-th DoS interval commences and τ n ∈ R 0 denotes the length of the n-th DoS interval. The collection of all sequences {H n } n ∈N of DoS attacks without overlap, i.e., that satisfy 0
Moreover, for a given {H n } n ∈N ∈ I D oS , we define the collection of times at which a DoS attack is active by
where we do not explicitly write the dependency of T on {H n } n ∈N ∈ I D oS assuming it is clear from the context. By means of this definition, we can now describe the jump/update ofŷ as in (2) for each transmission attempt at time t j ∈ R 0 , j ∈ N asŷ
and, accordingly, the update of the transmission error e :=ŷ − y as
for each j ∈ N.
C. Event-Based Communication
As already mentioned in the introduction, in comparison with time-triggered control, ETC is much more suitable for balancing network utilization and control performance. See also [15] - [18] for some early approaches of ETC and see [19] for a recent overview.
In this paper, we follow a design philosophy based on a dynamic event-triggered control scheme [12] , [13] , [20] - [23] , which has several advantages over their static counterparts, see [1] , [12] , [20] , [22] and [23] for more details on these advantages. A dynamic triggering condition in the context of this paper will take the form
for all j ∈ N, η(0) = 0, where m(t) ∈ {0, 1} is an auxiliary variable used to keep track of whether the most recent transmission attempt at time t ∈ R 0 was successful (m(t) = 0) or not (m(t) = 1) (due to DoS attacks), τ 0 m iet , τ 1 m iet ∈ R > 0 are (enforced) lower bounds on the minimum interevent times (MIETs) for the cases that m(t) = 0 and m(t) = 1, respectively, and η ∈ R is an auxiliary variable. Let us remark that, in general, if possible, it is helpful to schedule transmission attempts more often when a DoS attack is active in order to determine earlier when the DoS attack is over. For this reason, we consider two different waiting times τ 
where o = (y, e, τ, φ)
with λ ∈ (0, 1) representing the information locally available at the event-triggering mechanism (ETM) (see Fig. 1 ) including the output measurements y ∈ R n y , the transmission error e :=ŷ − y, and the auxiliary variables τ ∈ R 0 and φ ∈ λ, λ −1 . The variables τ and φ are discussed in more detail in Section IV. Observe that by taking τ 
D. Problem Formulation
Given the descriptions above, the problem considered in this work can now roughly be stated as follows. Propose a systematic design procedure forΨ, η 0 , τ 0 m iet , and τ 1 m iet such that the interconnection (P, C, N ) with P and C as in (1) and (2), respectively, and the transmission attempts being generated by (5) - (7), satisfies desired asymptotic stability criteria and performance criteria, in terms of the so-called peak-to-peak gain despite the presence of the DoS attacks {H n } n ∈N ∈ I D oS that satisfy constraints in terms of frequency and duration.
In the next section, we introduce a complete mathematical (hybrid) model for the event-triggered closed-loop NCS setup, definitions of DoS frequency and duration, and relevant stability and performance notions, leading to a more formal problem formulation.
IV. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE EVENT-TRIGGERED CONTROL SETUP
In this section, we reformulate the dynamics of the eventtriggered NCS subject to DoS attacks in the form of the hybrid model H T given bẏ
see [24] for details on this hybrid modelling framework. Let us remark that the hybrid systems considered in this paper have time regularization (or dwell time) and external inputs only appearing in the flow map. The latter allow us to employ the following signal norm definitions inspired by [21] . For any hybrid signal
Observe that this signal norm definition is similar to the corresponding classical continuous-time norm. In this paper, we employ the same notation for the L ∞ -norm of hybrid time signals and conventional continuous-time signals. Moreover, due to the aforementioned properties and notational convenience, we consider the disturbance input w : R 0 → R n w to be a time signal instead of a hybrid signal and use the usual definition for the L ∞ -norm.
A. Hybrid Model
To describe the NCS setup as discussed before in terms of flow equations (8a) and jump equations (8b), we first need to introduce a few auxiliary variables, namely, the timer variables s, τ ∈ R 0 representing the overall time and the time elapsed since the most recent transmission attempt, respectively. Moreover, we also introduce an additional auxiliary variable φ ∈ λ, λ −1 , where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a tuning parameter to be specified, used in the triggering condition and part of o as already mentioned in Section III-C. By combining these auxiliary variables with (1), (2) , and (7), the flow map of the interconnection (P, C, N ) can be defined as
where
with n x = n p + n c and λ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, the functions f and g follow from (1) and (2) and are given by
and f φ will be specified later. In accordance with (5), we define the flow set as
Based on (4) and (7), we specify the jump map as
such that ξ + = G 0 (ξ) corresponds to a successful transmission attempt and ξ + = G 1 (ξ) to a failed transmission attempt. Finally, the jump set is given by
The time constants τ 0 m iet and τ 1 m iet and the functionsΨ, η 0 and f φ are specified in Section V. Observe that the hybrid system description presented above leads to more solutions than induced by the triggering condition given by (5) and (7). 1 Moreover, observe that the hybrid system H T as described by (8)- (16) is parameterized by the collection of time intervals at which DoS attacks are active as defined in (3). Therefore, we write explicitly the dependence of H T on T .
B. Constraints on DoS Sequence
Since it is reasonable to assume that the attacker's resources are not infinite and that measures can be taken to mitigate malicious DoS attacks, a natural characterization of DoS attacks can be given in terms of DoS frequency and DoS duration as in [5] , see also Remark 2 below. Therefore, we define the collection of times within the interval [T 1 , T 2 ], with T 2 T 1 0, at which DoS attacks are active as
with T as in (3) 
where card denotes the number of elements in the set. We say that a given sequence of DoS attacks {H n } n ∈N satisfies the DoS frequency constraint for a given τ D ∈ R > 0 , and a given ν ∈ R 0 , if for all
We denote the class of sequences of DoS intervals that satisfy this DoS frequency constraint by I D oS,f req (ν, τ D ).
Definition 2: [6] (DoS Duration):
We say that a sequence of DoS attacks specified by {H n } n ∈N ∈ I D oS satisfies the DoS duration constraint for a given T ∈ R > 1 and a given ς ∈ R 0 , if for all
We denote the class of all sequences of DoS intervals that satisfy this DoS durationconstraint by I D oS,dur (ς, T ). We will also use the notation (3) with
Remark 2: Observe that Definitions 1 and 2 make no assumptions regarding the attacker's underlying strategy since they only indicate limitations in terms of the frequency and duration of DoS attacks. From a practical point of view, Definitions 1 and 2 are natural as well since there exist several techniques to mitigate jamming attacks, for example, spreading techniques and high-pass filtering. As a consequence, the frequency and duration of DoS attacks can indeed be restrained by exploiting such techniques, see, for example, [4] and [8] .
Of course, the desired control objectives, in general, cannot be achieved in case the DoS frequency and/or DoS duration can be arbitrarily large, i.e., in case τ D → 0 or T = 1, respectively, as in that case, every communication attempt can be blocked by the attacker with the consequence that the system is in open loop all of the time. Fortunately, as already mentioned in Remark 2, several provisions can be taken in order to mitigate DoS attacks with the aim to limit the frequency and duration of the time intervals over which communication is effectively denied.
C. Mathematical Problem Formulation
To specify desirable stability and performance properties, we introduce the following definitions that use the concepts of hybrid time domains and corresponding solutions [24] . In this paper, we assume that all hybrid trajectories start in the set
where φ m iet will be specified in Section V-B. Observe that this assumption only reflects the initialization of the ETM variables, which can be freely chosen, while we do not put any (initial) constraints on the plant and the controller states x = (x p , x c ) and the initial knowledge ofŷ at the controller side.
Definition 3: A hybrid system H T is said to be persistently flowing with respect to initial state set X 0 if all maximal solutions 2 ξ with ξ(0, 0) ∈ X 0 have unbounded domains in the t-direction, i.e., sup t dom ξ = ∞.
Definition 4: Let ν, ς ∈ R 0 , τ D ∈ R > 0 and T ∈ R > 1 be given. A closed set A ⊂ X is said to be uniformly globally asymptotically stable (UGAS) for the class of hybrid systems H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) with respect to initial state set X 0 if all systems H T ∈ H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) are persistently flowing with respect to initial state set X 0 and there exists a function β ∈ KLL such that for any H T ∈ H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) and for any initial condition ξ(0, 0) ∈ X 0 , all corresponding solutions ξ of H T with w = 0 satisfy
for all (t, j) ∈ dom ξ. The closed set A is said to be uniformly globally exponentially stable (UGES) for the class of hybrid systems H(ν, τ D , ς, T ), if the above holds with β(r, t, j) = Mr exp(− (t + j)) for some M 0 and > 0. 
We can now formalize the problem, which was loosely stated at the end of Section III. (7) and f φ as in (9) , such that the closed set A := {ξ ∈ X | x = 0, e = 0} is UGES and/or, in the presence of disturbances, has a finite-induced L ∞ -gain for the class of hybrid systems H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) .
V. DESIGN CONDITIONS AND STABILITY GUARANTEES
In Section V-B and Section V-C, the time constants τ 0 m iet and τ 1 m iet , and the function f φ are specified and design conditions for the functionsΨ and η 0 are presented leading to a solution for Problem 1. In order to specify the design conditions, we first start with the required preliminaries consisting of stability and performance conditions for time-triggered NCSs taken from [25] and [26] in Section V-A.
A. Preliminaries
Consider the following condition. Condition 1: [25] , [26] . There exists a locally Lipschitz function W : R n y → R 0 , a continuous function H : R n x × R n w → R, and constants L 0, c W , andc W , such that 1) for all e ∈ R n e it holds that
2) for all x ∈ R n x , and almost all e ∈ R n y it holds that
g(x, e, w) LW (e) + H(x, w). (24)
In addition, there exists a locally Lipschitz function V : R n x → R 0 , and a positive semi-definite function : R n y → R 0 and constants ρ V , ρ W , γ, c V ,c V , c z > 0, such that 1) for all x ∈ R n x c V |x|
2) for all e ∈ R n y , w ∈ R n w and almost all
3) the constants ρ W and γ satisfy ρ W γ 2 . Let us remark that for linear systems, the conditions above can be obtained systematically by solving a multiobjective linear matrix inequality (LMI) problem, see [12] , [13] , and [26] for more details. Also, several classes of nonlinear systems satisfy these conditions, see [13] .
B. Minimal Interevent Time
As already mentioned, τ 0 m iet and τ 1 m iet (and φ m iet ,Ψ, f φ and η 0 ) should be chosen appropriately in the sense that desirable closed-loop stability and performance requirements can be achieved. To do so, we specify the function 3 f φ : R 0 × 3 Observe that the flow map F as given in (9) is discontinuous in τ due to (27) . However, due to the facts thatτ = 1 and the right-hand side of (27) is Lipschitz continuous, we find by means of the Carathéodory's existence theorem that this does not cause any problems in the uniqueness and existence of solutions
with L and γ as given in Condition 1. The time constants τ 0 m iet and τ 1 m iet can be chosen less than or equal to the maximally allowable transmission interval bound (in this work referred to asτ m iet ) given in [25] as (28), indeed longer (average) transmission intervals are realized compared to time-based (worst-case) specifications as discussed in Section III-C.
Lemma 1: [25] Letτ m iet be given by (28), then the solution toφ
Finally, we define
whereφ is the solution to (29) (28) and with f φ and φ m iet as in (27) and (30), respectively. Moreover, suppose that the following three conditions hold:
1) The DoS frequency parameter τ D and the DoS duration parameter T satisfy
2) The functionΨ is given bỹ
where σ is a K ∞ -function that satisfies σ(s) ω 1 s for all s ∈ R 0 , the function Ψ : O → R is given by 
for τ ∈ R 0 and withγ as given in (33).
3) The function η 0 is given by η 0 (e) = γφ m iet W 2 (e). Then, the closed set A = {ξ ∈ X | x = 0, e = 0} is UGES and is L ∞ -stable with a finite induced L ∞ -gain less than or equal to θ κ c z β * with c z as in (25) 
iet T ), for the class of hybrid systems H(ν, τ D , ς, T ).
The proof is provided in the Appendix. Observe that the condition given in item 1) imposes restrictions on the DoS parameters τ D and T in terms of other system parameters. As such, the frequency and duration of the allowable DoS attacks are limited. Moreover, observe that the DoS parameters ν, τ D , ς and T affect the guaranteed L ∞ -gain of the system which illustrates the tradeoff between robustness with respect to DoS attacks and performance in the sense that, in general, robustness comes at the cost of performance.
Observe that in case communication is allowed, the transmissions are scheduled in an event-based fashion (to save valuable communication resources) whereas in case the communication is denied, the next transmission is scheduled again after τ Remark 3: Note that this implementation requires the knowledge about when DoS attacks are blocking transmissions, which could be realized by means of acknowledgements as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Let us remark that the ETM can easily be adjusted such that it is not required that acknowledgements are being received instantaneously. For example, the acknowledgement is allowed to be delayed with, at most, τ 1 m iet time units if after each transmission instant, the ETM keeps track of the evolution of η for both cases that the transmission has been successful or denied. For the brevity of exposition, this feature has, however, been omitted.
The presented framework does not require an acknowledgement scheme when purely periodic sampling with intersampling time τ 1 m iet is employed. The same design conditions lead to the same guarantees in this case.
Remark 4:
The proposed framework can also be used for the design of a static triggering mechanism, namely
with t 0 = 0 and with Ψ as in (35).
VI. CASE STUDY ON COOPERATIVE ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL
In this section, we illustrate the main result by means of a case study on cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC). As shown in [27] , in the context of vehicle platooning, wireless communication between vehicles can have a significant contribution to improving traffic throughput and safety. For a platoon of two identical vehicles equipped with CACC, the functions f and g as in (9) are given by f (x, e, w) = A 11 x + A 12 e + A 13 w and g(x, e, w) = A 21 x + A 22 e + A 23 w, where and is available at the ETM to determine the transmission instants. Before the ETM design and the stability and performance analysis, we first have to guarantee that Condition 1 is met. For the vehicle platoon system described above, we can take W (e) = |e|. Observe that with this choice, (23) and (24) are met with c W =c W = 1, L = 0 and H(x, w) = |A 21 x + A 21 w|. To comply with (25) and (26), we take (r) = qr 2 and V (x) = x P x, c V = λ min (P ) andc V = λ max (P ) where P can be obtained by minimizing γ + θ subject to the LMI given in (38) shown at the bottom of this page.
To illustrate the design procedure, we take λ = 0.7 and computeτ m iet (as in (28) In the top plot, the trajectory of the distance error z of the vehicle platoon for DoS-attacks of various sizes and the input w are given. In the bottom plot, the inter-event times of the dynamic event triggering mechanism described by (5) and (7) are given. Both plots were generated by taking ρ V = 0.5 and ρ W = 5 resulting in L ∞ -gain less than or equal to 5.35, that barely changes.
In Fig. 5 , the distance error/performance output z and the inter-event times t j +1 − t j are displayed for the case that ρ V = 0.5, ρ W = 5 and w as illustrated the figure resulting in an L ∞ -gain less than or equal to 5.35, 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we addressed the design of resource-aware and resilient control strategies for networked control systems (NCS) subject to malicious Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. In particular, the control and communication strategy was based on an output-based event-triggered control scheme applicable to a class of non-linear feedback systems that are subject to exogenous disturbances. The proposed framework led to guarantees regarding the existence of a robust strictly positive lower bound on the inter-event times despite the presence of disturbances and DoS attacks. Additionally, based on the natural assumption that DoS attacks are restricted in terms of frequency and duration, we showed that desired stability and performance criteria in terms of induced L ∞ -gains can be guaranteed.
APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem 2:
The main idea behind the proof is to regard the closed-loop system H T as a system switching between a stable hybrid model (when effectively no DoS attack is active) and an unstable mode (when effectively a DoS attack is active). Inspired by the concept of average dwell-time [11] , we can then exploit the duration and frequency constraints of the DoS attacks to conclude UGES (or L ∞ -stability a finite induced L ∞ -gain) of the set A for the class of hybrid systems H(ν, τ D , ς, T ). For clarity of exposition, the proof consists of four steps. In the proof, we often omit the (hybrid) time arguments of the solution ξ of a hybrid system H T and we do not mention dom ξ explicitly.
Step I: Lyapunov/storage function analysis. Let R (X 0 ) denote all the reachable states of a hybrid system H T ∈ H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) for ξ(0, 0) ∈ X 0 , see also [24, Chapter 6] .
Lemma 3: For any χ ∈ R (X 0 ) it holds that
Moreover, for all χ ∈ R(X 0 )\D there exists an ε > 0 and an absolutely continuous function z :
The proof is omitted for the sake of brevity. Consider the candidate Lyapunov/storage function,
Given the second and third item of Lemma 3 and the fact that according to Condition 1, V and W satisfy (25) and (23), respectively, and γ > 0, we find that there exists a positive constant c U ∈ R 0 such that
for all ξ ∈ R (X 0 ) where A = {ξ ∈ X | x = 0, e = 0}. Hence, U constitutes a suitable candidate Lyapunov/storage function for the cases w = 0 and w = 0, respectively. To study the stability and the performance, we will discuss how the function U evolves over time by considering both jumps (when ξ ∈ D), and flows (when ξ ∈ C).
Jumps:
We can see from (14) and (27) that at transmission events when communication is possible, i.e., if ξ ∈ R (X 0 ) and ξ ∈ D and s / ∈ T (and thus η = 0), we have that U (ξ + ) − U (ξ) = −γφW 2 (e) + η 0 (e). By recalling that η 0 = γφ m iet W 2 (e), the first item of Lemma 3 and by using the fact that τ τ 0 m iet when ξ ∈ D, we have that Case I (m = 0): From (24), (26) and (27), we can derive that for almost all ξ ∈ R (X 0 ) with m = 0 and for w ∈ R n w ,
+ 2γφW (e) (LW (e) + H(x, w))
with ω(τ, m) as in (36) and where M given by
where for all ξ ∈ X and w ∈ R n w
By using the fact that 2γφW (e)H(x, w) γ 2 φ 2 W 2 (e) + H 2 (x, w), we can conclude from (35) and (43) 
Using the latter fact, we obtain from (34) and (42) that for m = 0,
By using Lemma 3 and the fact that V (x) cV |x| 2 due to (25), we can conclude that for almost all ξ ∈ R (X 0 ) with m = 0 and for w ∈ R n w , we have that
with ω 1 as in (32). Case II (m = 1): Observe that for m = 1, we have thatφ = 0 andη = 0 due to (7), (27) and (34), respectively. Hence, it holds that for almost all ξ ∈ R (X 0 ) with m = 1 and for all w ∈ R n w
+ 2γφW (e) (LW (e) + H(x, w)) 
with ω 2 as in (32). In fact, observe that since ω 2 > 0 due to Condition 1, (47) also holds when m = 0.
Observe that a system H T ∈ H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) does not exhibit Zeno-behaviour due to a strictly positive MIET. Moreover, observe that finite escape-times are excluded from the system due to the bounds on the states x and e as in (40), (41), (46), (47) and the fact that the trajectories of the state variables τ, s, m, η, and φ do not exhibit finite escape-times. Given the aforementioned facts and the last property mentioned in Lemma 3, we can conclude that a system H T ∈ H(ν, τ D , ς, T ) with ξ(0, 0) ∈ X 0 is indeed persistently flowing with respect to initial state set X 0 .
Step II: Characterization of stable and unstable modes. In the previous step, we have shown how the Lyapunov/storage function behaves for both the cases where m = 0 and m = 1, see (46) (m = 0) and (47) (m = 1). To use average dwell-time arguments, it is needed to determine the collection of time instants at which either m = 0 or m = 1. Unfortunately, this can not directly be related to T , since the value ofŷ is typically not updated immediately after a DoS interval has ended due to τ 1 m iet being a lower bound on the inter-event times t j +1 − t j , j ∈ N, for which transmission time t j corresponds to an unsuccessful transmission attempt. For this reason, we will consider the "effective" DoS attacks, decompose the time axis accordingly and relate these "effective" DoS attacks to T via the collection of DoS intervals as given in (17) . To do so, we first define for a given maximal solution ξ, the collection of time instants in the interval [T 1 , T 2 ], with T 2 T 1 , at which the most recent transmission attempt was successful and at which no DoS attack is active as Θ ξ (T 1 , T 2 ) := t ∈ (T 1 , T 2 ) | t / ∈ T and ∀j ∈ N, (t, j) ∈ dom ξ ⇒ m(t, j) = 0 . (48)
The system H T is said to be in the stable mode (satisfying (46)) at a time instant t if t ∈Θ ξ (0, ∞). In addition, we define the collection of "effective" DoS attacks in the interval [T 1 , T 2 ], with T 2 T 1 as
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